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The Importanoe of the Problem
The U. S. Navy has embarked upon a technological
revolution. Some have called It a computer revolution, others a
nuclear revolution, and still others a technological revolution.
The progress in this revolution has been greater than the
transition from sail to steam, from cannonball to armour-piercing
projectile, or from steam to nuclear power. Mr, Ralph J.
Oordiner, when President of the General Slectric Company,
described this revolution when he testified before a Congressional
subcommittee on automation, in the following words:
When the history of our age is written, I think it
will record three profoundly important technological
developments
:
Nuclear energy, which tremendously increases the
amount of energy available to do the world's work;
Automation, which multiplies man's ability to use
tools;
And computers, which multiply man's ability to do
mental work.
Some of our engineers believe that of these three,
the computer will bring the greatest benefit to man.l
"•"Ralph J. Cordiner, gubcommittee on Economic
Stabilization of the Joint Committee on the Economic Report .
(Washington: Government Printing Office, 1955), p. ^^.

The technological progress of this era has presented the
Navy and its Oommanders of today with a new set of problems. One
of the major problems is the management and control of our
military forces at a time when devastation can be hurled halfway
across the earth in a matter of minutes. At this time, our
military forces cannot afford for a button to be pushed or left
unpushed—in error.
As pointed out by Admiral Olaude Hicketts
:
¥e must be capable of responding quickly and
effectively to military aggression short of general
war. We cannot predict, with assured accuracy, the
area, the time, or the circumstances of such aggression.
We must be ready to handle it wherever, whenever, or
however it may come.
2
During this advancing technological revolution, increased
emphasis has been placed on the introduction of new equipment into
Navy fleet operations. These new weapons, aircraft, and support
systems entering the fleets today and in various stages of
development for fleets tomorrow defy description, and it has all
taken place in the last 20 years.
Perhaps the most important advance of this decade was the
introduction of the computer into the naval operational environment,
Haval planning Includes even more automation for the future. Vice
Admiral William F. Raborn, USN, expressed his views on automation
^Olaude Ricketts, Admiral, USN, "Naval Power—Present and
Future," U. S« Naval Institute Proceeding:s
.
(January, 1963), p. 33.

3In a recent U, S. Naval Institute Proceedings as follows:
The internal control of ships will approach those
of the airplane. One man will be able to control the
maneuvering capability as well as the armament of an
entire ship.
5
The military approach during this age has been concerned
primarily with physical equipment. However, the Navy must be
practical; it must be able to use these new capabilities
effectively. The Navy must consider a factor which is just as
Vital, but apparently not as pretentious as the new equipment, and
this factor is the "Navy man." For the purpose of this paper,
the "Navy man" is the Fleet Commander. The time has come for all
military forces to heed the warning signs on the horizon. If
these signs are not given proper consideration, who will manage and
control our forces when the allowance time for the decision process
approaches zero?
The Problem
The purpose of this study is to determine the implications
on and the importance to the Fleet Commander and his staff of
Cybernetic Command and Control Systems,
^William F. Raborn, Vice Admiral, USN, "New Horizons of
Haval Research and Development, " U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings
(January, 1963), p. 42.

4The Approaoh to the Problem
!Phe Fleet Oommander * s staff. Its responsibilities,
organization and deo ision-making process will be examined to
determine the major effects and changes because of the introduction
of Cybernetic Oommand and Control Systems into the Fleet
Commander's operational environment.
Non-military information processing, management information
systems, and decision-making processes will be analyzed to develop
management implications because of the introduction of cybernetics
into the world of business and industry.
In turn, military and non-military implications will be
compared to study which areas and to what degree each has affected
the other.
Xhe 2ask Fleet Commander and his staff was selected as the
area of research since it is the largest combat operational unit
within the Naval Organization. Therefore, the impact of
cybernetics in the fleet environment should affect the Fleet
Commander and his staff with greater emphasis than other staff and
operational commands in the combatant Navy.
Heview of Literature
Literature on command control, cybernetics, and management
is plentiful. The technology and state of the art in automation
is advancing so rapidly that it is impossible to remain current on

all the latest Improvements. Most of the information written on
the implications of command suid control centers on the national
level, merely touches the operational phases. Ihe trade
magazines specializing in computers, electronic data processing
systems and the management of these systems are more useful than
books in keeping up to date.
The following sources were reviewed:
1. Grovernment, military and commercial technical,
industry and management periodicals from 1955 to date.
2. Available technical research reports on the subject.
3. The most recant books on computers, automatic data
processing, management, decision-making and Navy staff systems,
which are listed in the bibliography.
Semantics in Command and Oontrol Terms
In the research for this paper, semantics problems arose
over the definition of such words as automation, computers,
automatic data processing and other related terms. For example.
In regard to the nature and use of computers and automation, there
are two important classes of devices
:
!• Usually referred to when one speaks of automation are
devices that automatically perform sensing and motor tasks,
replacing or improving on human capacities for performing these
functions.

62. Usually referred to when one speaks of computers are
devices that perform, very rapidly, information processing and
routine or complex logical and decision-making tasks, replacing
or improving on human capacities for performing these functions.
In command and control and in business these two
devices overlap. Iherefcre, to eliminate the awfc^rardness of
repeating the words "automation" and "computers" each time, the
paper refers to both at the same time; and to avoid semantic
difficulties involved in using one term or the othei', the terms
"cybernetic," "cybernation" or "cybernetics" will be used to refer
to both "automation" and "computers." The terms are legitimate
to the extent that they are derivatives of "cybernetics," a term
invented by lorbert Wiener to mean the process of communication
a&d control in man and machines. The theory and practice of
cybernetics underlie all systematic design and application of
automation and computers.^
0|:g;anigati9.n Qf,tlLt^tudg:
To determine ^he implications of Cybernetic Command and
Control Systems on the I'leet Commander, the following questions
must be answered:
!• What is the job of the Fleet Commander and his staff
in the ilavy operational environment before and after cybernetics?
^Morris Philipson (ed.). Automation: Implications for the
Future (Hew Xork: Vintage Books, 1962), p. 126.

2, What is a Cybernetic Oomiaand and Control System, and
what is the role of the Fleet Commander In this system?
3. What are the implications of cybernetics on non-
military management and what analogies can be drawn between




The Task glee t Organization
To place the role of the Fleet Oommander in the proper
perspective, it is mandatory to review the place of the Task
Fleet within the Department of the Navy organization. The Task
Fleet concept was developed during World VJar II and is the
largest operational element within the Havy organization framework
developed for managing the Navy's combatant ships and aircraft.
Broadly speaking, the "Fleet" may be taken as the largest
organizational element that comes in direct contact with the enemy
in the performance of combat missions.^ This naval organization
was devised to take advanta(?;e of the mobility and freedom of
action that the sea and air afford to ships and aircraft in fast
moving, modern warfare.^
John R. Beishline, Military Management for National
Defense (New York: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1950), p. 29.
John D. Hayes, Rear Admiral, 'JSN, "The Navy's Task Force,"
Ordinance . (November-December, 1957 )» p. 39.
8

Forces of fleet size are assigned ships depending on the
mission involved. Ship types that could he assigned are carriers,
cruisers, destroyers and submarines. Other components which could
be assigned include Air Wings, and Service, Amphibious and Fleet
Marine forces.
Fleet Oommaader and His Staff
For operational direction or mission assignment the Fleet
Commander's chain of command runs from the President to the
Secretary of Defense and through Joint Ohiefs of Staff and Unified
Commander to the Fleet Commander down to his subordinate
commanders, fhe chain of command for purposes other than
operational direction of fleet forces runs from the President to
the Secretary of Defense through the Secretary of the Navy, the
Chief of li'aval Operations, the Unified Commander to the Fleet
Commander and then to his subordinate commanders. Ihis chain
embraces the training and readiness of military forces plus their
administration and support,-'
ifithin the li&vj chain of command, the Fleet Commander's
function is to authoritatively and effectively control and direct
the forces assigned him in the successful accomplishment of his
U. S, Navy, The Department of the Ijavy: A .Description of
its Functional Organization , MV-SKOS P-435. (Washington; U. S.
Government Printing Office, 1962), p. 1.

10
assigned missions. Simply stated, the Commander's primary
function is command. There are a number of details inherent in
large organizations which make it impossible for the Oommander to
accomplish his primary function of command. Therefore, the
commander must have a reasonable number of assistants to whom
these details can be intrusted. The staff must furnish the
commander all the necessary assistance so he may perform his
function of command effectively and make knowledgeable decisions.





5. Recommendations for plans and orders.
4. Preparation of directives.
5. Supervise and evaluate.
^
The first task of the staff is to "provide information"
which supplies the basis for the sound military decision.
Information on own and enemy forces plus other pertinent matters
must be obtained from every source, evaluated, and analyzed to
insure that it is sufficiently detailed and accurate for the
'^S. 3, Miller, Captain. USN, "Naval Staffs," Naval War
Oollege Review . (January, 1952), p. 2.
^ Ibid .. p. 3.
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Oommander to make sound strategic, tactical and logistic decisions.
This information must disseminate to all friendly commands who need
to know, both vertically and horizontally in the organization as
well as completely within the staff to insure coordinated staff
action.
The second point "anticipatory planning" concerns making
a continuous study of the situation and preparing plans for
possible future contingencies in the fields of strategy, tactics
and logistics.
"Recommendations for plans and orders" is based on the
particular mission of the Commander as well as directives from
higher authority.
The fourth task is to translate the Commander's decisions
into directives. This function includes the transmission of such
directives to the properly designated recipients.
The fifth function is to supervise and evaluate as
authorized by the Commander. Here certain designated members of
the staff supervise the execution of plans and orders, and take
such action as necessary, always in the name of the Oommander, to
Insure the Commander's intentions are carried out. Evaluating
concerns results of planned action in order to apply lessons
learned to future planning.^
^
Ibid .. p. 4.
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The general functions of the Fleet Commander may be
divided as follows
:
!• Operational—which lead directly to accomplishraent of
the mission.
2, Supporting—permitting success of number one above.
Supporting functions include physically building up and
maintaining the quantity of men and material of the command to a
point of adequate quantitative combat readiness; preparation of
forces, men and material, to a point of adequate qualitative combat
readiness, and maintenance of that condition; service for the
human and material requirements of the command, and maintenance
of the good condition of the personnel and material of the
command.
'
The method of executing the processes of command vary with
commanders. In the Navy these processes are much more flexible
than in other military organizations. Primarily, Fleet Commanders





3. Operations and plans.
4. Logistics.
5. Communications.
7Ibid ., p. 6.
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For example, the operational functions leading directly to
the accomplishment of the mission link directly to administration
which handles quantity of personnel, records, control and morale;
intelligence which provides information of enemy forces and other
tangible and intangible elements bearing directly and indirectly
on the achievement of the Commander's mission; operations which
prepares plans, organizes, trains personnel and provides
intelligence on own forces; communications which provides rapid
means for direction of forces for the Commander and keeps other
interested commands advised on what they need to know.
In the supporting functions all five functional divisions
work together in providing adequate quantitative and qualitative
combat readiness, particularly with operations in respect to
training of personnel. Also, logistics and communications provide
support in regard to materiel.
The Fleet Commander does not have a standard staff
organization and in the past has not trained officers
specifically for naval staff duties other than training gained by
experience. Navy operational commanders are given wide latitude
in organization of their staffs. Prior to the advent of the
technological revolution, there were very few specialists in a
sea-going staff. Also the size of the commander's staff could be
^ Ibid .. p. 7.
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influenced by space limitations aboard ship. When insufficient
space is a factor, the principal administrative and logistic
functions of the staff may be performed largely by a rear echelon,
thereby keeping such functions at a minimum on the operating
staff. So the Fleet Oommander's staff could be separated into
two components: operational and administrative; wherein the
administrative portion is minimized when actually in combat areas.
Of course, since naval staffs are flexible, the Pleet Commander
could take his whole staff aboard the flagship.
In the Fleet Oommander's case, a certain degree of
unofficial standardization in staff organization has developed.^
Oommander Second Fleet's staff organization is shown in Figure 1.
His staff, organized to meet his particular requirements, is
divided into four staff sections or divisions. Each division is
administered by the first-mentioned officer in the division. This
organization provides for logistics billets in both the Operations
and Plans Divisions; intelligence is handled within the Plans
Division. Note that several billets are common to the Operations
and Plans Divisions.^*-^
Q
The United States Naval War College, Staff Systems Command
and Staff Department s (October, 1952), vv» 18-20.














The Navy Decision-Making Process
In reviewing the methods for executing the processes of
command and analysing the organization, it is apparent that the
element of decision is of primary importance. Decision-maJcing will
be performed by the Commander, but it is his staff which prepares
and furnishes the information for decisions. Decision-making may
be recognized as the basic structure upon which naval staffs are
organized.
Decision-making under the Task Pleet as well as other
military organizations has been formalized into a system. It is
called the "estimate of the situation" technique. Solutions to
problems of Waval Warfare arrived at by this technique give a
mission to be accomplished, tasks to be perfonaed, and the forces
necessary to perform them. The product of the "estimate" is an
operation plan.
A military commander may approach decision with either of
two philosophies.^^ He may select his course of action on the
basis of his estimate of what his enemy is able to do to oppose him,
Or, he may make his selection on the basis of his estimate of what
his eneiRj is going to do. The former is a doctrine of decision
based on enemy capabilities; the latter, on enemy intentions.
^^0, G. Hay^food, "Military Decision and Game Theory,"




The doctrine of decision of the ilaval Fleet Oommander is
a doctrine based on enemy capabilities. The Commander is enjoined
to select the course of action which offers the promise of success
in view of the enemy capabilities. ^
The process of decision, as approved by the Joint Chiefs
of Staff i3 formalized in a five-step analysis. These steps are as
follows:
1. Determination of the mission.
2. Description of the situation and courses of action.
3. Analysis of opposing courses of action.
4. Comparison of own courses of action.
5. The decision, ^5
Although the Fleet Oommander follows these steps in making
a decision, it must be noted that when he makes a decision an
Intangible element known as military judgment is used, just as
business decisions are made with business judgment. -^^
The word "decision" implies choice, a resolution among
alternatives. The principal prerequisite for a decision is the
definition of alternatives in a form that will cause the decision
^^ Ibid .. p. 366.
•'•-^John McDonald, "How Executives Make Decisions," The
Executive Life , ed. Sditors of Fortune (Garden Oity, N, I.:




maker to exercise his power of judgment in resolving tham. The
staff assembles all the pertinent facts, orders thera so as to
define the alternatives they Implj, rules out those alternatives
that are clearly infeasible or precluded by existing policy or
other mandatory constraints, and presents; those remaining to the
Commander for resolution—a decision. This familiar staff process
accounts for much of the information that flows into the staff
organization and is stowed away, searched out, assembled, and
reassembled in the decision-making process.
Usually no matter how thoroughly and carefully the
alternatives are defined, the Fleet Commander is seldom satisfied
the first time around. Bj some subtle, sub,jective process
compounded by experience and the mysterious working of the faculty
of human judgment, the Commander will ferret out some overlooked
fact or point out some different ordering of the facts, so the
process must be done again. Or, by this same ill-defined process,
the Commander will reach what proves to be the right decision for
a particular case when the right decision was not one of the
alternatives presented.^^
Id „
-^John A. Ohastain, Mho is in Command: Commander or




OYBMITETIO OOMMAND ANi) OOri'KOL
A Brief History of Ooigraand and Coatrol
Before presenting a brief history, it would be worthwhile
to define coizBiand and control in the military ooauaand environment
today. The standard lailitary definition for oamjoiand and oontrol is:
An arrangement of personnel, facilities and the means for
information acquisition, processing, and dissemination employed by
a Commander in planning, directing and controlling operations. -*•
Command and control is not new. I»iilltary commaaders have
always devised organizations and methods to secure knowledge needed
to make informed decisions and issue commands.
In the early days of the Navy, the Commander carried most
of his battle plan in his head. He had a small staff, if any at
all, but in a sense was still organized for command and control.
Contacts with his superiors might have been days or even weeks
apart. Battle and even wars were sometimes won or lost before the
first Hint of the start of battle reached heads of governments.
"^Clifton L. Nicholson, Lt. Ool., U3AF, "Ooinmand and Oontrol
and Declsion-Haking Process," Air University Heview (i\iovember-




An early illustration of command and control is the coast
watchers who sighted the armada from the English Channel cliffs
and were as much part of Sir Francis Drake's command control
methods as today's radar or intercept equipment is part of the
p
ultra-modern Navy command and control system.
There are many examples of battles where today's concept
of command and control would have been useful. News of Admiral
Dewey's victory in Manila did not reach Washington for a number of
days. Also on December 7, 1941, when Pearl Harbor received a
surprise attack. Admiral Kimmel and General Short had no
communications with Washington.^
The decisive victories in battle have been marked by great
advantages gained or lost by command and control of forces more
often than by superior force itself, leaving little doubt that the
lessons of history in all ages define the first duty of command as
establishment of the means of command.
In World War II the Oombat Information Center was created
to provide the commander with the means for command and decision.
This system collected, correlated, displayed and evaluated combat
information for decision-making purposes. The commander was able
'^Fred W. iCittler. Captain, USN, "Command Control—The Navy'$
Link to Global Strategy, ' Iav§d_^^ineer3 Jouriaal (February, 1963),
p. 31»
^~
^Austin M. Porter, Odr., USN, "Command and Control,"
laval ij^-n^.ineers Journal
. (February, 1963), p. 28.
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to see things happening through the information provided by the
Combat Information Center. Still the conduct of the battle moved
too fast, even then, for him to hear and see all that was
transpiring in a tactical situation. So, even in World War II,
there wag a great need for improved command and control systems.
Today, as a new technological revolution is moving into
the military environment, the command and control systems have
become a necessity.
Ihe Med for Ovbernetic Oommand and Oontrol
The technological progress of this era has presented the
nation as well as the Fleet Oommander with an extraordinarily
different requirement for facts as compared to those necessary
during World War II or Drake's day. The advent of the long-range
missile, the atomic weapon and the jet aircraft have, by their very
nature placed an emphasis upon the need for Oybernetic Oommand and
Oontrol Systems to provide the necessary information for decision-
making. The question arises why the strong emphasis on command
and control systems?
The need for Oybernetic Oommand and Oontrol Systems can be
categorized into two primary areas: "time to react" and "alternate
choices."
By "time to react, " the inference is to the problem of
attack. In the early days the nation and the Pleet Oommander wanted
to be informed within two days of any significant event around the
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world—then 2^ hours—-then 20 minutes warning time. How the time
4is approaching zero.
Factors contributing to reduction in "time to react"
include the following:
1, The emergence of the intercontinental ballistic missile
as the primary punch of global war. This missile poses serious
threats to the nation, such as the time in which the nation has to
react, and the unimaginable, terrible consequences if the
information of a missile attaolc by an aggressor were wrong.
^
2. The development of the jet aircraft and atomic weapons
have reduced the time factor and pointed out the need for command
and control on both the National and Fleet Commander's level of
operations. The nation must be capable of deterring nuclear war,
and if that fails, to win a nuclear war."
In "alternate choices," the United States defense
capability must provide the President a choice between alternate
courses of action—not lust surrender or global nuclear war. The
"alternate choice" need has forced command and control experts to
"^David F. Seaman, Captain, USH. "Intelligence in the Fleet"
gaval :5n^ineers Journal (February, 1963 )» p. 61.
5"The Search for Effective Command and Control," Armed




devise systems that are sophisticated, as well as have the
capability of handling more factors •'<^
Ihe politico-military objectives of the United States
further point out the necessity of command and control, Xhe major
politico-military objectives have been stated as follows:
1. To deter any attaclc, whether conventional
or nuclear, upon our territories, and upon those of
our allies, and to defend these territories when and
If they are B.ttacked.
2. With the failure of deterrent action, to
endeavor to contain over-all damage and to emerge,
ultimately, the victor in the struggle, after the
appropriate military action has been taken.
3. To assist in the strengthening of the Free
World against the Oommuntst menace and its plan for
global domination.'^
The politico-military situation prevents establishing firm
objectives for military commanders to use in contingency
planning.^ Rather, it places emphasis on the ability to keep
planning flexible to an unprecedented degree and to be able to do
detailed planning very rapidly. Because of the necessity of
keeping our forces deployed continuously in a variety of trouble
spots in what nominally is a time of peace, this situation contains
political and diplomatic, as well as military factors. The Ouban
experience is an example.
^Ibid .
Qjohn T. Hayward, Vice Admiral, USN, "Command and Control
in the Muclear Age, " U. 3. Naval Institute Proceedings





The constraints on the military commander in planning,
In exercising, and in employing his forces, require command and
control means that will permit decisions to be monitored, or
participated in, by higher commands in much greater detail than
ever before, and this must be accomplished without any
significant delay in the declsion-malcing process,-'-^
Oommand and Oontrol Systems
A command and control system is a composite of equipment,
skills, and teclmiques vfhioh are capable of performing clearly
defined functions enabling a commander to exercise continuous
control of his forces and weapons in all situations by providing
him with the infoi'mation needed to make operational decisions and
the means for disseminating these decisions,^ A complete system
includes all sub-systems, related facilities, equipments, services,
and personnel required for operation of the system so that it can
be considered a self-sufficient iiait in its operational
environment
.
Information processing in command and control systems is
the processing of information in direct support of the command
decision process, therefore, included are personnel, weapons,
logistic and sensor systems needed in the command process while not




control of weapons or sensor systems, i.e., radar, radio,
receivers. Third, the subject involves the data processing need
to supply information to the Commander and his staff, therefore,
one of the most salient characteristics of such systems is that
they have man/machine complex.^
The man/machine complex refers to the concept of the
relationship needed between the Commander and the equipment. The
principle of man and machine will be discussed further in this
study.
Cybernetic Command and Control Systems refer to systems
which have a general purpose digital type computer with "real-time"
and "on-line" operation oapabilities. To further understand the
concept of Cybernetic Command and Control Systems, it is necessary
to define "real-time" and "on-line." Richard S. Sprauge defines
these terms as follows:
In a total on-line and real-time system each and
every person, machine or point in the organization using
the system, having a tn^e requirement to originate,
retrieve or utilize information, is provided a point-of-
origin device. These devices are connected to a central
data prooe?5sing complex by wire or other direct
communications links. Bach device permits two-
directional information flow at a point of origin of
information such that the person or machine using it
rooeives. responses to his requests in the amount of time
desired. ^^
^^Walter F. Bauer, "Military Command: A Ohallense for
Information Processing," Computers and Automation (April, 1963), p- 9.
•"^Richard B. Sprauge, aieotronic Business Systems:
Management Use of On-Line—Real-Time Computers (Hew York: Roland
Press Company, 1962), p. 5.
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A general definition found In data processing glossaries
defines "real-time" as "the performance of a computation during the
actual time that the related physical process transpires in order
that the results of the compilation are useful in guiding the
physical process, "-^^ or "the processing of information or data in
a sufficiently rapid manner so the results of the processing are
available in time to influence the process being monitored or
controlled. "-^^
xhe computers used in Uyberneiiic Command and Control
Systems have large-scale storage and data processing capability and
wide ranging flexible iniormation request devices. The system is
capable of accepting revision, resti'aints and parameters by the
Fleet Commander so he may derive workable solutions in his decision-
making process.
The elements of a Havy type Cybernetic Command and Control
System are as follows
:
1. Sensors, i.e., radars and sonars.
2. i)ata storage and processing equipments, i.e.,
computers, primary systems and sub-systems.
3» Input and output equipments, i.e., printing machines
or displays.
^^"A Data Communication Glossary," jDatamation (I'ferch, 1962),
p. 72.
i^Executive Office of the President, Bureau of the Budget,
Automatic Data Processin/z; (Glossary (Washington: U, S. Government
Printing Office, 1962), p. 41.
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4. Oommunloatlon links, i.e., links which permit transfer
of data from remote sensors, control forces and distant weapons.
5. The human element, i.e., froai equipment operators
to Fleet Oommanders who utilize the whole system in making
decisions. -^^
Colonel 0. J. Dayis, U. 3. Army, in his article "Oommand
Control and Oybernetics" defined the elements of a cybernetic
system as "sensing, collecting, processing and displaying
17
components." ' Both of these definitions are correct j it Is a
matter of degree, the first more inclusive than the latter. For
purposes of this paper the first definition will be used since it
refers epsoifioally to the Navy typo system.
The Status of Oommand and Control Systems Joday
The status of command and control systems in this changing
technological age is very difficult vrithout getting into the
military security plct'-ire. Sl;acc this paper does not Intend to get
Into the classified area, the status of Navy coiroaand and control
systems will be demonstrated by giving brief s-ommarlzations of
unclassifiad systems in use and in the planning stages.
•^^Fred W. Kittler, "Command Control—The Navy's Iiink to
Olobal Strategy,'"'" Naval L'nfulnoerr jQ-grnal (J'ebruary, 1963), p. 32.
^7o. J. Davis, Colonel, U. S. Army, "Ooiaiaaiid Control and
Cybernetics," Army (January, 1963), p. 51.
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The Naval Tactical Data System
The Naval Tactical Data System (NTDS) Is a system ^Ich
Is installed and operating in the fleet today. It is a shipboard
system dasi-^ned to enable a ship to handle tactical inforiaation
more rapidly and efficiently than ^ras previously possible. This
systeji operates in real-time , is on-line and oonsiats of both men
and equipment. ^^
This equipment receives inputs froa nonatn^i; devices,
processes the data into a usable form, mafees routine calculations,
then coiiununioates the required infornatlon to the Tnen In the
system, and assists in e^^iecuting orders mads by the Ooiamander and
other men in the system. The system also provides for the rapid
communication of combat information between ships.
This jaan/machine oomplez provides coiiiwunications Loth
internal and external to a ship. GomputerE and display consoles
talk to each other on a particular ship and between ships in the
task fleex. M-ch ship is thus given the ability to act faster,
more accurately, and Fith greater reliability in combat situations.
Further, the task fleet as a whole has a greater capability. "^^
The Naval Tactical Data System furnishes the Fleet
Oomaander with a series of alternate recommendations on the weapons
which should be used against the enemy. The Commander may accept
^^S. G. Svends en. Captain, USN, "Naval Tactical Data




the recommendations made by the system, or may make another
decision based on his own Judgment. In either event, the system
stands ready to transmit orders to his own fire control center or
to the ships and the aircraft which will participate in the attack.
The computer used in the Naval Tactical Data System is
described technically as "a general purpose, stored-program
machine with a very high speed, random access memory containing one
million bits of information."^^
For comparison this equipment simulates a large business
system with strategically located division offices (ships), all
bound together by an information and control network. The
complete network, in effect, not only keeps the home office (Fleet
Commander) instantaneously aware of regional and system
fluctuation in sales, costs, inventories and profits, but takes the
pi
necessary steps to correct imbalances.
The Marine Tactical Data System
The Marine Tactical Data System (MTDS) uses a modular,
integrated hut concept which can be transported by helicopter,
transport aircraft or truck. This complex will allow Marines, when
making a landing, to track enemy aircraft by radar and to assign
2^Paul Oonlln, "Oombat Oomputer Boots Navy*s Sea Punch,"
Armed Forces Management (July, 1961), p. 15.
^^Grilbert Burck, "The Boundless Age of the Oomputer, "
Fortune (March, 1964), p. 108.
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controlled interceptors and antiaircraft missile batteries with
the aid of high speed computations by digital computers. The
equipment permits integrated air defense, close air support,
enroute air traffic control and control of surface to air missiles
22
to be established within a short time. The Marine Tactical Data
System would be used with the Naval Tactical Data System when the
Fleet Commander's mission was to acquire enemy real estate through
an simphibious landing.
Problem Areas in Development of Command and Control Systems
The problem areas in the development of command and control
systems include the three primary categories listed below:
1. Communication problems.
2. Problems in data handling.
3. Problems in requirements.
Communication Problems
first, the importance of the communication problem in
command and control has been pointed out by Dr. Robert Pfefferkorn
of Martin Company, when he said: "A Command and Control System is a
^^
"Marine Tactical Data System," ADP Service Newsletter
(February, 1962), p. 3.
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communication system, "^ It is noted that the 0^ principle
advocating the inseparability of communications, command and control
is becoming widely accepted in the command and control field. The
Pleet Oommander would be unable to function effectively without
24
reliability and survivability in all phases of his communications.
The solution to this problem centers on the development of
survivable communications through hardening, dispersal and
redundancy, Survivable communications means communication across
the entire spectrum of the art, including applications of VHF and
microwave systems, broad-band cable, HF, lono- and Trophospheric
-
scatter, UHP and communication satellites, as well as rocket
communication systems. Satisfactory progress is being made in
research and development which indicates that this overall problem
will be solved in the near future. Oommunications have developed
to the point today where control is possible from any location and
25
is not limited to physical proximity to the fighting force. Also,
through development in micro-electronics, size and weight of
23Robert G. Pfefferkorn, "Taylor's Flexible Response
Strategy Shifts Oommand and Control Perspective," Armed forces
Management (July, 1963), p. 34,
2''+0, W, Burklund, "National Military Oommand and Control,"
Armed Forces Management
.
(July, I963), p, 20,
25verden McQueen, Lt. Ool, tJSAF, "Total Oommand and Control
through Computers," Armed Forces Management . (July, 1963) » p. 26,

32
equipment are being reduced and reliability and survivability are
being increased.^" Today it appears the solution to communication
problems has advanced further than many of the other problem
areas. '
Problems in Data Handling
Second, the data handling problems cover three primary
areas which are significant enough to warrant attention. Ihese
areas include:
1. Standardization and improvement of the computer and
associated equipments (hardware).
2. Improvement and standardization of software.
3. Development of close relationship of man and machine.
In reference to the standardization and improvement of the
computer system there is a need for improvement in the performance
capabilities of storage devices such as disc files, and for
development of more rapid peripheral access to and from the central
computer. For example, an optical reader is needed to provide for
direct input of hard copy.
Charles T. Garland, "Naval Communications Today and for
the World of Multi-megaton Weapons," Maval Engineers Journal .





Computers must fit better into the environment of the Navy
shipboard installation. They are adequate functionally, and
speedwise, but cannot cope properly with the Navy environment
because of their size. Ihe weakest link in the Navy Command and
Control System is the display area.^" There is a lack of automated
display for the information fed into the sea-arm system. The
development of miniaturized equipment is considered an soiswer to
the environment problem. Progress in this area has been
satisfactory and will meet the Fleet Commander's needs in ten years.
Although there is room for standardization and improvement of
computers and associated equipment, the present rate of progress of
basic computer characteristics—logic, design, speed, capacity--
is satisfactory. The needs of today are being met, and the needs
of tomorrow will be met if the present rate of progress continues.^
The computer programming for command and control of the
future is difficult because of the scope and magnitude of
processing requirements and the used, for accelerated development.
Considerable progress is being made in computer program production.
There is a better understanding of the management and development
aspects as well as a continuing development and an increasing
2^
"The Maval Tactical Data System: We Have More Than 800
Command and Control Systems," Armed Forces Management . (July, 1963)
»
pp. 44-45.
"Vmere the Computer Pits in Command and Control,**
krmed Forces Management . (July, 1962), p. 22.
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acceptance of procedure oriented languages. Also, there have been
Improved compilers, and studies have heen made on the more efficient
utilization of computers for program production and checkout. ^^
Computer technology has developed so fast that the
programming and designing elements in the coamand and control area
have not been able to keep pace.-^ Strategic and tactical problems
must be analyzed and systems devised before equipment can be
properly developed. The development of operational designs and
programs is a difficult task, and when accomplished, the systems
phase will be improved.
The major Havy improvement of late has been in programming.
Several hundred programming projects have IseQH developed and 50^
32
have been analyzed, with a number completed. Oonsiderable
programming additions have been made in the fields of intelligence
and logistics also.
Another problem area of data handling is the need for the
development of a closer relationship between man and machine. In
this area one of the main problems is the translation of the subtle
50"The Search for Effective Oommand and Control,"
Arm^d i^orces Mana^.ement . (July, 1962), p. 19.
^^Ibid .. p. 20.
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innuendoes of force operations into concrete formats which a
computer can use.-^-^ It is a problem of identifying bits of
Information which, when synthesized, will reveal significant trends.
There has been increased emphasis placed on the man/machine concept
by all services. 3^ An increasing understanding of decision-making
as a man/machine process and other developments leading to
technological improvements are receiving top priority attention by
the experts in command and control.
Languages have always been a problem in oommand and
control. Many command and control failures in the past can be
traced to failure in distinguishing between a plan and an order, or
an order and a command. -^^ Computers have introduced even newer
language. Automated systems involve the use of programming language
and machine computer. Unfortunately these nevT languages consist of
a wide variety of tongues and dialects. Only recently has it
become apparent that problems such as inter- and intra-system
compatibility are mainly language. -^^ If language is to convey
information from one component of a system to another, it must be




^^"I'Th.ere the Computer Pits in Command and Oontrol, "




The Department of Defense is now working in the area of
standardization of languages—the assumption is that the language
adopted should be the same as that used by the business community.
One reason difficulties have arisen is that programming languages
at their present level has probably Just become ready for
standardization,-^'
Problems in Eequirements
The third and final major problem area in development of
command and control is requirements. Educating lavy commanders to
computer technology and assuring that those who make conuaand and who
control machinery know intimately the requirements and needs of the
specific coamander will be a giant step in the right direction. 2?o
go further, the determination of what the military requirements of
system really are needs to be answered. \iha.t does the commander
really need to know? What information is of real value and not
merely Interesting background ?^^ One difficulty has been in finding
military men who know enough about computer technology to link the
machine to combat operations,
jiJssential to the design of a command and control system is
teamwork between military strategists and technicians. Sach must
know intimately the needs of the other.
^'^IMi.
^
*'!fhe Search for Effective Oommand and Control, "
Armed gorces Management , (July, 1962), p. 19.
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In an interview with an authority in the Chief of Naval
Operations* Oomiaand and Oontrol Office, it was pointed out that
"great strides have been made in the last year in regard to the
requirements aspect of command and oontrol. Oommanders and
technicians are beginning to see the problems and ara working
closer together. "-^^
There is no question that proble)3!S confronting the experts
in command and control will be large in the years ahead, but they
also insist that these problems can be solved. Future
improvements, aooording to these experts, will not be great leaps
forward, but modest improvements which will meet the needs of Naval
comanders/°
Ihe national level of development is in the formative
state, but on the unified and specified command and service level
considerable progress has been made—development of L* systems in
the Air Force and the Naval i'actical Data Systems in the Navy
illustrate that complete control through computer analysis is
possible within the next few years. Both these systems have been
operational for some time and results obtained have been beyond the
expectations of the Air Force and the Navy.
-'^Interview with Assistant to Naval Command and Oontrol
Executive in the Office of Deputy Chief of Naval Operations,
October 24, 1963.
^^"The Search for Effective Command and Oontrol,"
Armed Forces Management
.





With the bright outlook for solution to the major problem
areas, future controllable forces provided by the armed services
42
will be possible; uncontrollable forces will be phased out.
^^Austin M. Porter, "Command and Control," Naval Engineers
Journal . (February, 1963 )f p. 27.

OHAPTBR 17
5PHB IMPLICATIONS OF INFORMATION TBOHNOLOGI
ON NONMILITAHY MANAGMSNT
Information Technology and Maaagemeat
Information Systems
Over the last decade a new technology, called information
technology has begun to take hold in American business, so new
that it is difficult to evaluate. Many aspects of this new
technology are uncertain, but it has moved into the business
managerial scene rapidly, with definite far-reaching impact on the
managerial organization and managerial decision-making. As
discussed previously, at the same time but at a much more rapid
rate, this technology has moved into the military activities and
changed, as well as improved command and managerial processes.
Information technology has several related parts.
Primarily it consists of the techniques of processing large amounts
of information rapidly for managerial purposes and is epitomized by
the high-speed computer. Other parts of this technology include
Harold J, Leavitt and Thomas L. Whisler, "Management in





the application of statistical and mathematical methods to
declslon-malcing problems and the simulation o£ higher thinking
through computer programs.
Ihis study is primarily Interested in the information
processing aspect of the new technology, and management information
and real-time, on-line business systems which are similar to
Cybernetic Oommand and Control Systems.
Management information systems are defined as
communication process in which data are recorded and processed for
p
operational purposes. fhe problems are Isolated for higher level
decision-making and information is fed back to top management to
reflect progress or lack of progress in achieving major objectives.
Ihese systems are built around the power of a large scale electronic
computer, as is Navy command and control system, and involve huge
storage capacities, immediate accessibility to stored data, and
input/output hardware to efficiently retrieve data. Major effort
lately in developing these systems has laeen in the areas of storage
and retrieval of large masses of data. Considerable progress has
been made and new equipment is being introduced in these areas
every day.^
^Bxecutive Office of the President, Bureau of the Budget,
Automatic Data Processing Glossary , p . 54
.
^Robert Bosak, "Implications of Computer Programming
Research for Management Controls, " Manajsiement Control Systems , eds.
Donald G. Malcom and Alan J. Rowe, (lew York: John Wiley and Sons,
Inc., i960), p. 211.
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The ultimate goal of effective laanageiaent Information
systems is to keep all levels of management completely informed
on all developments in the business which affect them,^ An ideal
system would be one which would: First, receive any data, correlate
It with information already stored, and store the data; and
secondly, have the ability if asked any question, to pull out
information and give an answer to the question,^
The criteria of management information systems which will
provide the required intelligence and information for business
management are as follox-j's
:
1. It facilitates planning and control, and provides top
management with a comprehensive understanding of these factors,
both external and internal, which influence the conduct of business.
2. It provides for performance measurement of functional
responsibilities, and at the same time, presents top management with
the means for overall review of company-wide operational results of
a consolidated nature.
3. It provides all information requirements for dynamic
operational control in all areas of management structure that are
profitable or desirable for the organization as a whole.
4 tiJames D. Gallagher, Management Information Systems and




4. It provides for the development of those
Informational requirements that are essential to the continued
development and application of advanced scientific management
techniques.
5. It is dynamic in nature, capable of change to conform
with shifts in the socio-economic and political environment in which
business must survive.
Another view expressed by computer experts on information
systems is the total management system aspect. Mr. R. L. Martino,
Manager, Management Systems Department of Olin Mathieson Chemical
Corporation stated in a recent article that the functions of a
total management system are:
1. To predict;
2. To compare prediction with actual results;
3. To produce the deviations between the predicted
and the actual. Thereafter, the system should use these
deviations to prepare a new, updated set of predictions
which can be used as the basis for management decision.
»
The predictive function includes the determination and
consideration of alternatives, and for each alternative, the effects
of decision. The method used in this process is called simulation,
a technique wherein the various factors involved in a given
^Norman J. Ream, "The Need for Compact Management
Intelligence," Manaaiement Control 3;y5tems, ed. Donald G. Malcom
and Alan J. Rowe^ fNevTlorlc; John iv'iley and Sons, Inc., I960),
p. 93.
'''r. L. Ilartino, "The Development and Installation of a
Total Management System, " Data Processin?^ for Management . V"
(April, 1963), p. 32.
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situation are assembled into a model, usually of a mathematical
nature. By varying the factors systematically, it is possible to
weigh each alternative and its effects,
A total management system produces basically two kinds of
information for all levels of management: (1) predictions based on
historical data and simulation, and (2) suggested changes of
o
present procedures to make the selected predictions possible.
The predictions are continually compared with actual
results to determine deviations. These deviations, in turn, are
used to refine or revise the initial set of predictions and
strategies. Then, the whole system recycles, producing new
predictions.
There is a need in business for total management systems
so managers can look ahead and anticipate changes in markets and
profit situation. So, a system is required that will forestall the
development of an unprofitable business situation. Therefore, the
primary objective of total management systems is the production of
detailed, up-to-the-minute summaries of the past and use of these
summaries to project future activity,^
Mr, Richard IS, Sprague and other computers experts say that





on-line—real-time variety. This prediction is based on careful
analysis of historical development, present trends, basic economic
pressures., and the relationships among all these factors in the
fields of management information and control systems, and computer
systems.
Just what on-line—real-time management information
systems and total management systems can mean to business can be
demonstrated by giving examples of existing applications. The first
is SABRE, American Airlines* seat-reservation system, which is
basically a highly ingenious method of keeping inventory up-to-date
on reservation systems. Another example is Westinghouse Electric *s
steady progress in building up an integrated data system. Ihe aim
of this system is to shrink the lead time in the management
Information cycle to practically zero, and eventually to be able to
prepare a final report that will include just about everything top
management needs to make its decisions.^
There are a number of systems operating in on-line—real-
time today. One of the most interesting applications is Lockheed's
Inexpensive and sophisticated system for controlling costs of what
was a complex and intractable production process. This system
relieves management of a lot of unnecessary detail. It enables
^Richard E. Sprague, Electronic Business Systems (ITew York;
The Ronald Press Oo., 1962), p. 3.
"'^Gilbert Burck, "On-Line in Real-Time, " gortune . LXIX
(April, 1964), pp. 143-144.
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manageraent to locate work in progress Instantly, analyzes costs
Instantly and maintains complete records of costs and quality of
goods purchased •^
As in coimaand and control, information is also the power
and control behind business cybernetic applications. Only a
businessman who knows what is happening inside his company as soon
as it happens can truly adjust his means to his aims; and make
decisions about these aims. The same is true with the Fleet
Commander; he must be able to make "real-time" decisions based on
his operations plans and objectives. -^
TaQ Nonmilitary Decision-Making Process
For an analysis of nonmilitary decision-making before and
after the introduction of cybernetics, it is necessary to discuss
and define decision-making as it is practiced by the business
manager
•
>&•. John McDonald in a book by the editors of Fortune
states
!
fhe business executive is by profession a decision-
maker. In fact, business executives, along with
politicians and military officers, are the principal
professional decision makers of the world. Of the. three
groups, only the military have a formal doctrine. -^-^
The question is how do executives go about making
decisions? There are many different doctrines and procedures, some




defined, some not so clearly defined. Mr. McDonald in his article
discusses this subject at some length. The concensus in his
article is that a decision maker in effect stands between past
events and future events. He finds a frequency pattern in the past
that, projected into the future, gives him a probability of
reoccurrence, which is about all the precise, quantitative
knowledge he can obtain of the future. But some decisions—for
example investment decisions—are novel and nonrepeatable. Most
difficult of all are those that are "strategic," i.e., open to
upsets by the counter action of competitors. Such decisions are not
governed only by laws of probability. Hence, in most cases, the
executive has no perfect information, nor has he the calculating
capability with which to construct probability expectations in the
future. In many situations he faces the unknoi^n. ^hat he does in
these situations is not clear.
Peter P. Drucker in his book, The Practice of Management .
said decision-making has five distinct phases:
1. Defining the problem.
2. Analyzing the problem.
3. Developing alternate solutions.
4. Deciding upon the best solution. ^c
5. Oonverting the decision into effective action.
Mr. Drucker divides decisions into two types: First,
tactical, which is the unimportant, the routine or problem solving
^^Peter 1?, Drucker, The Practice of Management (l^ew York:
Harper and Brothers Publishers, 1954), p. 353.
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type. In this case the job is merely to choose between a few
obvious alternatives. And the criterion is usually one of
economy J The decision shall accomplish the desired end with the
minimum of effort and disturbance.
The second type of decisions are called strategic, as
mentioned by McDonald. These decisions are important and really
matter to the manager. Decisions of this type involve either
finding out what the situation is, or changing it, either finding
out what the resources are or what they should be. They are called
managerial decisions. Anyone who is a manager has to make such
decisions, and the higher his level in the hierarchy, the more of
-I
^
them he must make.
Another noted authority on the nonmilitary decision-making
process is Herbert A. Simon, who states:
In order to make a reasonable decision, there has
to be an objective or a goal—something we are trying
to accomplish. So somewhere along the process it is a
good idea to get clear as to what that objective or
goal is. IT
In addition, Simon breaks down the elements of decision-
making as follows J
•^^ Ibid .. pp. 351-352.
^"^Herbert A. Simon, "Background of Decision Making, "
Naval War Goll^efne H -^view . (November, 1957 )» p. 2.
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1. Clarifying, stating, or defining the
objective.
2. Finding some alternative courses of action.
3. Evaluating the actions in terms of the
objective and in terms of side effects.
4. Oheclcing the action out,
5. Acting on the decision. i^
So, to be sure, there are a number of different doctrines
for nonmilitary decision-making. Some are closely related; some
are not. The processes of decision-making discussed in previous
paragraphs primarily covered practices prior to the introduction
of information technology on the business scene. New tools which
assist in the process are operations research and tools of
information—called information processing and management
Information systems. Today's manager must understand the basic
method involved in making decisions to use these tools. Without
such understanding he will either be unable to use the tools at all,
or he will overemphasize their contribution and see in them the key
to problem solving—not decision-making.
Computers and Decision-Making
After discussing and defining decision-making as practiced
in business at this time, it is worthwhile to take a look at
oomputers and decision-making.
Decision-making is an activity which has historically been
performed by people. People are defensive about their exclusive
Ibid ., p. 3.
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prerogatives to perform and make decisions. To suggest that some
Inanimate object like a computer will make decisions previously
made by people is damaging to the ego and thus constitutes a major
form of heresy.
Nevertheless the computer will assist the decision maker
and make some decisions. The capability of the digital computer
to make a decision has often been described as one of the funda-
mental characteristics of the set of equipment which constitutes
a digital computer system. The concept of automatic decision-
making has become inseparable from the computers in minds of most
experts today. '^
The decision-making process when computers are used can be
described in tei^ns of data collection, information processing, and
decision-making. It is evident from such a description that data
reflecting events and objectives are the basis for all decisions
made. More specifically, the decision-making process of a data
processing system consists of
s
1. Data generation for recording of events.
a. Instrumentation for recording of events.
b. Written forms for recording of events.




b. Detecting discrepancies from plan.
c. Summarizing and organizing data.
'"^John A. Postley, Gomputers and People (New York, Toronto,




a. In operating situations.
b. For planning purposes.^0
The digital computer can be most active in the information
processing phase of this process. Its operation is faster, more
comprehensive in scope, and more accurate than any person or group
of people can possibly be. The digital computer today is becoming
increasingly effective in making decisions based on results of
these processing activities. It is of fundamental importance,
however, that the value of processing and decision-making based on
the results thereof is entirely dependent on the data; no
improvement which can be introduced by digital computers in these
areas can overcome the inaccuracies or incompleteness of the data.
Pailure to introduce valid data into the calculations can result
only in the more rapid production of worthless results. ^^
Decisions are without question no better than the data on
which they are based; they are quite likely to be as good in a
system wherein processing and decisions are made by a digital
computer, and they are almost sure to lose something in any
translation by manual means.
In focusing on decision-making as a critical characteristic
of the management Job, there is another aspect of recent
technological advance that is already leading to changes and may





information technology refers to the application of statistical and
mathematical methods to decision-making problems. In applying
these new techniques the computer is essential.
The new analytical techniques for processing information
have developed primarily from the initial impetus during World War
II, where the approaches devised then have brought an array of
quantitative techniques to bear on a wide range of management
problems. Of these analytical techniques, the following are
identified below:
1. Linear Programming--using a mathematical
formulation for obtaining the theoretically best
solution for problems of allocating scarce resoujrces
among competing uses.
2. Dynamic Programming—a mathematical
formulation applicable to the problems of economic
administration of continuous, interrelated processes.
3. Game Theory—introducing into mathematical
formulation considerations of strategy and counter-
strategy among competitors, to find the best strategy
against an opponent's possible actions.
4. Statistical Jjecision Theory—for introducing
subjective assessments of probability into mathematical
formulations of management problems.
5. Heuristic Programming—a computer technique
utilissing shortcuts in the form of "rules of thumb" or
"heuristics" which greatly reduces the volume ot
computations involved in solving a complex problem. ^^
The introduction of computers as well as these new tools of
analysis are changing the concepts of decision-malcing and placing
more emphasis on the manager as a decision maker. Also questions
Slave been stimulated about the future of management and management
^^elvin Anshen, "Managerial Decisions," Automation and
Itoechnological Qhange . ed. John T, Dunlop (2nglewood Oliffs, New
Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1962), p. 67.
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organization. In the next section the implications of this new
information technology on management will be discussed to see what
the impact is on management today as well as in the future.
The Implications on Nonmllitary Mana/^ement
The impact of an increasing rate of technological change,
i.e., introduction of cybernetics in management information
systems, is one of the most critical problems facing management
today. It will have more effect on business management and create
more problems than any of the other trends in economy and society.
Plrst, implications on the upper level of management will be
discussed to study the impact of this change in that area.
Implications on Corporation Executives
Management, to keep pace with the new information
technology, will have to strive increasingly to become
professional, to acquire through training and experience, skills
which will enable managers to look at business as a whole, as an
integrated system. Freed by management information handling
systems from routine tasks, management will learn to focus on
^road, long-range policies rather than on narrow, short-term
operating or functional problems. The primary concern of
executives must be the establishment of a proper policy and frame-




3ut once routine decisions have been assigned to the
computers, executives will face the unenviable job of having to
grapple regularly with a growing number of problems that are too
complex for the compiiters. Shese corporation leaders will also
have to accept the fact that such decisions will bscorae even more
complex because of lengthened time span (occasjioned by forward
planning), changes in scope of decisions (no longer local,
regional, or even national, but international), in imposed limits
(the increasing role of government), and in resource commitment
(needed for larger capital resources).
Management, therefore, must become steadily more
analytical and scientific, with the role of "hunch" and even
"informed judgment" becoming steadily smaller. At the extreme,
this theory ?fill mean increasing use of sophisticated analytical
approaches to management decision processes such as mathematical
programming and the extensive use of computers. At the very
least, the manager will have to be able to isolate and clarify the
variables that need to be considered in making decisions, to
consider carefully the soundness of the quantitative inforaation
gathered about these variables and be able to assign intelligent
but frankly subjective weights to variables on the basis of his
'^^"The Challenge of Technology to I4anagement, " Letter by
Associatj.on of Consulting I-lanaj^^ement jingineers. 1963, Series No. 1,
(October, 1963), p. 1.
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experience, Shis is a process of clarifying and bringing to the
surface the variables and implicit logical models now being used
by managers and one of improving the logic of the models.
In dealing with new tasks, managers will not only have to
employ the tools of information processing and cybernetic
management aystems, but th&y will be expected to know, understand,
and handle the new concepts and tools of ana.lysi£i, progranmiing and
decision-making, as discussed in the previous cection.
Such new concepts and technicjuss, as awesoae as they seem,
are going to be welcomed by tomcrrow's iianagers, for their ^ob is
going to be so complex, so big, and so demanding^ as to require all
the methods of simplification and systS:iiatisatlon that are
available*
Because of the intellectual and technical deniaads that such
sophisticated meastires place on senior a-anagsrs, another L^portant
change will be employing nu^eroas staff specialists to advise thsm
on special aspects of their work. The top-level luanagsr may have
attached to his office a planning staff, a personnel advisor, an
economist, a legal counsel, an export on foreign business, and many
others. Similarly, the major production, marketing, finance, and
engineering executives will be served by operation sjialysts,
marketing research specialists, statisticians, physicists, chemists,




knowlsdse from nianj disctplinQS can ba bought to bsar upoa
strategic decisions of the coapanj.^
The Oontroverslal Middle Management Question
According to Harold Leavitt of Oarnegie Tech and Thomas
Whlslar of the University of Chicago, information taohnolo??T will
have four effects on management:
!• Planning will be transferred from rriiddle
management to top level specialists*
2. Larae industrial or'^anisations will
recentraiize with more of the creative functions
beln,^ talceii on at the top levels.
3. There will be a radical reorganization of
middle management.
4. And the line separating the middle management
levels will be more sharply drawn. 2°
The effects proposed by Leavitt and lihisler are subject
to challen.7.e. 5)he argument used by the experts to refute these
effects Tnay be stated as follows:
1. It is erroneous to thirJr that in the foreseeable
future computers and analytical techniques will he able to perform
even a major share of the complex, nonprogrammable decisions made .
by managers. But since it is true that computers will In time be
able to malce most of the programmable decisions, and since many of
the decisions made by middle management are of this routine kind,
this argument still does not grant a reprieve to the middle
2^Ibid., p. 2.
^^Leaxritt and Whisler, pp. 41-42.
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Dianager. But ths next two ar^iiments do,
2, It is false to thini: that, Just bec8.use a machine can
do something better than a jnan, the machine will be used
automatically. To believe that it will is to i{inore the economics
of the situation. If the computer rents for Sl2,000 per raonth,
for example, it obviously will have to 0.0 i,iore and better iforii:
than can 12 middle managers ^t.oh paid f1,000 per month,
-Experience to date, ho^rever, indi^ate'^ that cotiputers are pressed
to equal efficient human outpuo in areas other than rote
arithmetic oomputatlon. Oiioa the problems bocome Kore complez,
dlfficuities of programming 3l0¥ -d-o^^n the proci^as con?3lderabl7,
while costs ( tharJrs to machine "d.o\rii tiif^s") sost.
3. Paper gains projected by me^chine devotees often fail
to materialise once a partially computerised d^cieioii system is
introduced into an ortga-rwizaticn of hum.an managers. A person would
have difficulty kaoKing this aliead of time. The procomputer
literatur3 gloiYo; the technicians within coi-'ipanie^^ see the machines
as ae\: flefe in a gi'owing estate; a fe>" sample nuis by the salesmaa
"pro^e" the machine's superiority over the liiiddle managf^r. But
what happens af uer inetallation? Idealized situations often
become complicated by iudivldual and group reactions against the
machines—-motivation suffers and pressur<?G ariss. Dhere is, say
the folloi"~ers of this line of thiaiiin£-y sufficient case evidence
available to indics.te that until a greater understandln^-j of the
problems arising from the interactions of humans and machines is
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obtained, the introduction of information processing devices in
many companies is going to be slowed. ^^
Time will tell the impact of the new information
technology on the middle manager. But it is certain right now
a person who desires the title of manager in the future will have
to understand the theory, applications and capabilities of the
new information and decision-malcing technologies. The manager who
does not understand this role will inevitably become subservient
to the superior knowledge of professional experts in the new
business science. Obviously, then, the managers of today will
have to grow with the challenge, through education—formal or
otherwise.
The Decision-Malcing Process
The decision-malcing process after the introduction of
cybernetics was discussed at some length earlier in this study.
Some top managers and computer experts in nonmilitary enterprises
believe that the ma^or effect of information processing and
related management information systems techniques on management
functions is to facilitate the decision-making process. This
effect will be accomplished by giving the manager accurate and
timely information with which to measure more precisely the
^'"The Challenge of Technology to Management," Letter bv
Association of Consulting: Hanagement Engl^neers . 1963, Series No. 1,
(October, 1963}, ppt 2-3.
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economic and operational consequences of a decision. The decision
cannot be an automatic response to the information input. The
manager's judgment, and the responsibility for the consequences,
will not be transferred to a data processing system, at least not
in the foreseeable future—and never in the area of top management
deoislon-malcing,^°
Other experts point out that decision-making is in a
transition from traditional to modern techniques. Instead of
judgment-intuitive type decision-making, the major decisions will
be made through operational research and other techniques. As
discussed earlier, this method of obtaining solutions is placed in
terms of mathematical and statistical studies of relations between
variables to provide the best alternative among a number of
alternatives. Info3rmation processing will handle and manipulate
the data necessary for decision-making.
There is no question, in the decision-making area, the
information technology impact on management is in progress. The
use of such theories as heuristic problem solving, game theory and
linear programming indicate that a transition in decision-making
is taking place in the business world today. ^^
28jaaes D. Gallagher, "Management Information Systems and
the Computer," The Executive . (December, 1961), p. 9.
29i!^alter Buckingham, Automation: Its Impact on Business and
People (Uew Torks Mentor Sxecutive Books, 1963), p. 53.
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Essentially, improvements in management decision-making
will arise because of three basic processes:
1, The quantification of selected data will substantially
improve not only the amount of facts in a specific report bearing
on a specific decision area; it will also improve the information
content,
2, Decision-making will also be based on the evaluation
of a wider range of alternatives and of current factual data,
rather than on intuition and the extrapolation of historical data.
3, The impact of decision in one functional area on
other functional elements of a business will be more easily
measured and, as a result, a more comprehensive view of the
business can be taken. ^^
Centralization or Decentralization?
The question of centralization or decentralization has been
a controversial one for a number of years. Henry H, Albers in his
book Organized Executive Action stated that "the emphasis in recent
years has been to the philosophy of decentralization but the
student of management should not neglect the importance of
centralization. "^^
^^Gallagher, p. 11.
3lHenry H. Albers, Organized Sxeoutive Action (Hew Tork:
John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1952 ), p. 156.
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Another expert, Walter Buckingham, said: "information
technology allows management to cope with increasingly complex
problems using fewer people and a more centralized
organization. "^^
The concensus of most, in the literature on the question
of centralization or decentralization, is that the introduction
of cybernetics has slowed the progress toward decentralization in
nonmilitary organ3.zatlons and movement now is toward
recentralization. Companies adding new units that previously
would have been granted considerable autonomy will now depend on
a strong central control, not only in operational planning but in
setting of operating and financial policy, -^
Although the trend is toward recentrsilization, there are
still a number of questions which need answering. Such as: Is
there a tendency toward geographic centralization or
decentralization? Is there a tendency toward greater
administrative centralization or decentralization?
'She Planning Process
The rapidity of technological change is forcing companies
to pay much more attention to the planning process, especially
^ Buclclngham, p. 54.
33Auren Uris, "What's Ahead for Middle Management?"
The Executive . (October, 1963) i p. 21.
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planning for change, and its counterpart, •pl:ximlnQ necessitated
h'/ chanj^a.^ A few reasons thlis is happening are;
Product life is being shortened. The traditional cycle
of product innovation is being telescoped—-not b:/ planned
obsolescence or styling changes, but by genuine technological
innovation. Uhe scientific revolution, such as the break-throughs
in electronics, physics, chemistry and mathematics, have mad©
possible a surging flood of new products, neif materials, new
processes and new techniques. Ihe potential they create for
greater change is enormous.
'Ihs reaction tiae of laanagement must be reduced. X»eeway
in adopting to scientific change has disappeared. Management must
lnQQ^ track of a number of fundamental areas of scientific work, and
must be skilled in identifying and exploiting emerging
opportunities ahead of competition. Management must continually
interpret the total marketing climate in terms of rapid
technological change.
Hhe life of business and industrial processes, as well as
products, is being both shortened and changed. Much of the new
technology, particularly that part dealing with information
processing, is beginning to affect the manner in which business is
conducted. -"^
^'''"irhe Challenge of technology to I^anagemant, " Iietter .^bj
Association of nonsuiting laanagement Bn^ineers . 1963, Series l^o, X,




The increased complexity and tightened interrelationships
or functions within a single organization, together with the ever
more complex relationships with other organizations mean that
successful and rapid adjustment to change is impossible without
the ability to plan effectively.
ibr these reasons, and many more, management must sharpen
its ability to anticipate the future more precisely in its overall
planning responsibilities.
It is clear that a gradual evolution is taking place in
the business and industrial processes, organization structures
and the pi'ocess of managing under the impact of technological
progress, llhis change threatens the survival of established
companies with myopic managers, just as it creates opportunities
for those managers who fully grasp the nature of the environmental




IHi; II4PLI0ATI0NS OF CIBBRNBTIO OOMMAIO) AND OOHTROL
SYSTSMS ON THS PLBBT OOMMNDER AND HIS STAFF
The Qhanjgjng Role of the Fleet
Oominaiider and His Staff
Before discussing specific Implications, It Is worthwhile
to place the Fleet Oommander In the role of a commander and
manager of an on-llne--real-tlme Cybernetic Oommand and Control
System. The role as presented here Is not completely operational
In the fleet, hut based on the movement of both, the
technological revolution and Information technology; systems of
this type will be Installed and used by commanders In the near
future
.
The Introduction of cybernetics, the rapid advances of
weapon systems, and time periods to react have presented the Fleet
Oommander with a real challenge. As Captain Mason Freeman, U. S.





If nuclear war should come, we'll have time,
because of surveillance capability, to make the
original commitment of forces from the National
Oommand and Control Center. From there on, the
Oommanders will be largely on their own and we will
provide them with the necessary tools to the best of
our ability.
1
Time periods for Fleet Commanders to react have changed.
Twenty years ago, during World War II, time was measured in days
and hours for oommand decisions. Now, time has been reduced to
seconds—-"real-time. " The power of weapons when combined with
reaction time implies an important challenge to the Fleet
Commander of today. This is especially true when he receives the
"go ahead" from the National Command and Control Level. Under
these conditions the implications are that the Commander's
decisions in a short time could level countries and have far-
reaching effects on a world-wide basis.
The Fleet Commander's information needs are affected by
the forces environment; i.e., type of conflict (cold war, limited
war, general war); conflict phase (tension, potential warning,
exchange, recovery); physical location (in-port, underway);
doctrine (scope of command); and support conditions (communications,
intelligence, logistics). So the Fleet Commander's information
"The Naval Tactical Data System: We Have More Than 800
Command and Control Systems," Armed Forces Management . (July, 1963)j
pp. 44-45.
"Where the Computer Fits in Oommand and Control,
"
Armed Foroes Management . (July, 1962), p. 24.
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needs will depend on the specific conditions under which
particular operations are being conducted. Large volumes of data
may be needed, or under another set of conditions requirements
could be critical items in the shortest possible time.
The complexity of warfare has increased for the Fleet
Commander 5 the number of parameters, and the many courses of
action which will be available to the Oommander will be solved by
a Navy Oybernetic Oommand and Control System.
Command and Control Systems are the means by which the
Fleet Oommander controls his ships, weapon systems, obtains
knowledge of enemies* capabilities, and takes into proper
consideration factors bearing upon these forces.^ The major
elements of his command and control system can be classified as
"structural" and "technical." The structural part of the system
is the Commander's staff, the organization imposed on the staff
and the procedures and doctrines the staff follows. Technical
elements of the system are the communication system, computers,
sensing equipment, other technical aids and specialists who operate
these parts of the system. The structural element of the command
and control system is the job of a military strategist or
tactician, such as the Fleet Oommander.
^Fred ¥. Kittier. Captain, USH, "Command Control—The Navy's
Link to Griobal Strategy, Naval Engineers Journal . (February, 1963)»
p. 31.
^"The Search for Effective Oommand and Control, " Armed
Forces Management . (July, 1962), p. 19.
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The Ooaiaander * s staff must be able to perform a multitude
of tasks in providing timely information to aid in command
decisions. The information system must be capable of receiving,
by all possible means of transmission, updated information of
many kinds. The information received must be analyzed by the
staff and added to the file of existing information. If
calculations have been based upon previous information, new
processes of calculation or extrapolation must be initiated.
Finally, the Commander must be able to extract meaning from all
this information.
One important factor of command and control is the
isolation of the decision maker; the Fleet Commander must be
separated from the massive and complex data manipulation functions.
It is essential that the maximum amount of information necessary
be provided for the Commander *s task, but at the same time the
minimum amount possible to cut down the digestive, interpretive,
and possible confusion aspects of the output information.
The role of the Fleet Commander can be broken down into
two areas ; the role of a Sfaval Commander as a planner and executor
of strategy and tactics; second, the role of a manager in the
management control of the Cybernetic Command and Control System.
These factors have made a different type Fleet Commander than that
pictured ten years ago. The Commander of today must be redesigned
Into a highly trained specialist who will have an ingrained
operational knowledge of tactical force operations combined with a
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"bhorough understanding of the management concept of automation.
5
These characteristics are essential to the use of command and
control systems in the maneuvering of modern warships.
The introduction of automation into command and control
systems has not decreased fleet operations* dependence on the
Commander sjid his staff. The computer has removed much of the
menial-numbers and paper workload and has provided the Oommander
and his staff with needed time for studying and making decisions
on the conduct of force operations,
Ihe Fleet Oommander *g ReQuireiuents in
Qybernetlc Qommand and Control
The new approach to command and control must be the
"total systems" approach due to "real-time" requirements on the
Oommander and his forces. This system must be complete force
control by computer analysis; such as an integrated automated
system for each ship, as well as the entire force; each ship and
the force will have the capability of automatic steering which can
be controlled by the Fleet Oommander or by the individual ship's
Oommandlng Officer; an automatic navigation system with automatic
collision avoidance equipment installed to steer on a preselected
(programmed) course and avoid collisions automatically when moving
^Fred W, Kittler, Gaptain, USI, ''Command Control—The
Navy*s Link to G-lobal Strategy," Naval Engineers Journal ,
(February, I963), p. 31.
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from one area to another.
A considerable number of attack options must be provided
to meet a large set of predicted military situations. Therefore,
the computer must be a general purpose, digital type with
"real-time" operation capability and wide ranging and flexible
Information request devices. The system must be capable of
accepting revision, restraints and parameters by the Fleet
Ooromander so a workable operation order can be derived to conduct
operations. The Oommander must be able to collect information
and immediately process and compare it with the basic information
he carries aboard in his system. Simultaneously, the system must
speed the results of the collection to higher command.
Date Processing Systems
To further illustrate requirements of Cybernetic Oommand
and Oontrol for the Fleet Oommander, it is necessary to look at
the Data Processing System concept which includes three of the
elements listed above.
The Data Processing System is a ma,Jor area of concern for
the Oommander because information is assimilated, stored,
correlated and extrapolated to provide the Oommander with decision-
making information.
Robert J3. Stark, Captain, USN, "The Ship as an Integrated
System," Naval Eng:ineers Journal , (May, 1963), p. 32S.
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The primary Data Processing System, in support of the
Fleet Oommander*s declsion-malclng, consists of three central
parts: input, data processing, and output. Ihe system can best






























Figure 2.—Data Processing System's Functions
^Vfalter F^ Bauer, "l^ilitary Command : A Challenge for




This figure sumiaarizes the capabilities and functions of
the three central parts of the system. The input area deals with
receiving of data from eztarnal sources as /fall as data prepared
internally. The main function to be performed by ths input system
is the entire nanageaent of input data.
An output system must provide communications to humans
through i^roup display, console or individual display, and hard
copy print-outs. The functions are entirely similar to those of
input. In addition to the functions of formatting, logging, and
editing, there is an additional function of information retrieval
or file searching. The output system may have an input capability
all its own. It may have, for example, a man/machine console to
make information requests and to generally direct the information
to be put on the group displays.
Data processing capabilities are as shown: data processing
and communications with Inrmt and output. The functions are to
maintain the data base, to analyze data, and to retrieve
Information, The last item, that of total system's management,
Is important because it refers to the overall electronic
management of the automated system.
The primary computer system is the central computer
system, which is the technical heart of well-integrated command and
control systems. It stores information such as contingency
operation orders, assimilates and correlates revisions of orders,
and manipulates all information received to provide the Commander
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with necessary lixfonaatlon for deolsioas and issuance of orders.
Ifen/Machine Concept
Another laost important concept oi command and control
systems is the close relationship needed between the Ooramander and
the aquipment— "man/iaaonine" concept. 'Ihe machine system must be
organized to give and receive data from the Oommander on the
Ooituaander's teras.
Figure 5 portrays the close relationship between man and
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Prior to attack, as well as during attack, the machine
receives information from communication devices and secondary-
supporting computers and displays the information. The Commander,
the man, analyzes incoming information as to the status of his
forces and those of the enemy. Ihis machine receives additional
information and updates the situation display. The man evaluates
an operational situation based on information the machine has
displayed. In so doing requests are made of the machine to which
the machine responds, since it is impossible for the system to
cover, under normal output procedure, data reflecting all
contingencies in which the Commander might be interested. The
man identifies certain courses of action and the machine computes
hypothetical effects based on various possible choices. The man
makes the decision and the machine communicates coimnands to the
other ships in the force and at the same time records them. The
"hypothetical effect" capability in command systems helps the
Commander make correct decisions during the actual attack.^
Interrogation of the system by man can provide the Fleet
Commander with important information; i.e., request for weapon
status of ships in the force. Through proper formatting and
compatible language, the machine will provide the weapon status
for each ship in the force.
^Ibid .. p. 11

73
The Data Processing Systems and sub-systems organize
Information into a more readily usable form to help the
Commander better plan to make faster and more knowledgeable
decisions, ^ So it is important to realize that a Fleet
Commander's prerogative is not in any sense usurped by the
processing system. The electronic system extends his intellect
and amplifies his ability to handle many facts affecting
decisions. Therefore, a human element in the command and control




The Commander's viewpoint of the system is presented to
illustrate how information is obtained for decision-making
purposes. Therefore, the Commander's viewpoint is presented in
the following chart.H
Austin M. Porter, "Command and Control, " Naval En^Xneera

















As shown in Figure 4, the Ooimaander will receive
information from the machine, from console displays and group
displays, and from hard copy printouts. The ratio of the amount
of data coming from each of the areas depends on the type of
operations in progress. The primary source of information is
the display areas, where the Commander can see the entire
tactical picture and make the necessary decisions from the data
displayed. Console displays reflect the working display to help
prepare and format group displays and to react to particular
requests from the Commander, Hard copy output represents the
back-up data which are frequently used for reference. At this
stage, the data processing system is simply a "black box" from
the Commander's viewpoint.
The most important aspect for the Commander is to be
able to communicate with the machine in his own language; the
Navy language.
Specific Implications on Fleet Commander
and His Staff
Implications of new technology and cybernetics on the
Fleet Commander and his staff were partially covered in the first
section of this chapter, the changing role of the Fleet Commander
and his staff. To further analyze these implications, specific
areas of impact xfill be discussed to provide insight into the




Centralization Trend in the Navy
In the past policy-making civilians and top level
commanders at the national level devoted their attention to
general strategic direction, leaving details of operations to
the lower echelons, i.e.. Fleet Oonmander, Today, not only the
basic decisions on the B&vj'b participation in any conflict and
the response to any threat, but decisions relating to use of
weapons which might cause the escalation of a small war into a
large one will be made by the top officials in Washington
beginning with the President, -^^
The trend is toward an increasing volume of information
exchange throughout the chain of command, from top to bottom and
bottom to top. The Fleet Oommander will be required to furnish,
througii the National Command and Control System, more information
than ever before and at a much more rapid pace. The result is
that Cybernetic Command and Control Systems will be required to
acquire, screen, collate and display information in transmitting
reports, decisions and orders throughout the chain of command,
National political leaders have made it clear that the
use of military forces world-wide must be centrally monitored





that the implloations of all aotlons, political and military,
are interrelated, without respect to geographical or command
boundaries. It has also been concluded that uncontrolled action
at any point can trigger reactions escalating to nuclear war;
therefore, the risks implicit in initially decentralized control
cannot and will not be taken, especially at the beginning of any
conflict. ^5
Means must exist for two kinds of control which are
opposites in theory but complementary in fact. Centralized
control must be available from the highest level to the smallest
military unit if that unit is the military force to be applied
at a precise location, and if the decision to use it must be
quickly made at the national level. Decentralized control must
also exist at all levels of command. If the means for
decentralized ooitrol do not coexist, the entire structure could
collapse if the center of control were to be destroyed or
rendered impotent through loss of its ability to communicate. A
military posture dependent solely on centralized control without
the alternative decentralized system and procedures for its uses
is a delusion and would create major problems in this
technological age.^*
^^ Ibid .
^^Ibid .. p. 29,
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From the fleet Coaiaander and his staff's viewpoint, this
centralization trend removes some of the Oominander * s decision-
making to a higher level in the chain of command. In oase of
limited war major decisions would be made at the national level;
on the other hand, if needed, the Fleet Commanders and other
lower level commanders must have at their finger tips the ability
to step in to take comiaand of the situation. ^
Effects on Fleet Oommander*s Staff
and Interoommand delations
The introduction of cybernetics into command and control
systems will not significantly decrease dependence on the
Oommander and his staff for informations processing. Further,
the computer system will be e.:iibedded in the operation, language
and mission of the Fleet Oomms,nder. The computer will remove
much of the menial-numbers workload—providing the Oommander and
his staff with much needed time for studying the situation and
making decisions. "^-^
In the analysis of the Fleet Commander's staff, the
functions of the staff were discussed to provide a frsjnework for
^^"The Naval Tactical Data System—We Have More Ihan 8OO
Oomraand and Control Systems, " p. 44.
-'•""Where the Oomputer Fits in Oommand and Control,"
Armed Forces Management . VII, (July, 1962), p. 22.
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studying the Implications on the role of the staff In the
performance of these functions.
In regard to the task of providing information, computers
will be able to collect, assimilate and manipulate data for the
staff's use in all areas of the command process. These functional
areas include administration, intelligence, operations and plans,
and logistics. The menial-numbers and slow process of collection
will be replaced by the rapid and more accurate work done by the
computer. The Commander will have more information as well as
more alternatives when he is making a decision on the conduct of
his forces. ^'^
In anticipatory planning and recommendation for plans
and orders, cybernetics will assist the staff in preparation of
contingency operations plans which can be placed on the computer
to be used by the Commander as combat events occur. These plans
would be stored in the computer in the form of an information
base. This information base, required for automating command
operations, is the primary concern and the direct task of the
Fleet Commander's staff. The staff must also maintain the
information base, develop plans, lay out programs, establish
planning factors and specify operating procedures. Thus it is
from this daily work of the staff, from the dynamic perspective
.J.CV
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of the command context, that the informational requirement of
staff headquarters must be generated. The staff will establish
an information base as a result of real and present needs for
18information, plans and programs required by the Fleet Commander.
Workload of the staff will be reduced in the area of
written directives and orders. The command and control system
will be able to carry the bulk of communications formerly handled
by other means. This staff will be responsible for translating
and being sure these orders and decisions are relayed to
subordinate commanders, as well as seniors in the chain of command.
Supervising and evaluation, another function of the
Commander's staff, can partially be handled by computers through
the feedback principle which would let the staff know if
directives are not being acted upon. The supervising and
evaluating tasks will be performed more rapidly and with more
precision than ever before. In evaluating plans and orders,
results will be brought into the open, and the staff will be able
to program futxire planning easier and with more confidence.
A Fleet Commander's staff, like his force, develops a
personality shaped by its sense of common purpose and is greatly
influenced by the personality of the Commander. It is this




quickly to changing situations and to insure a continuity of
dedication throughout his forces. The advance of cybernetics in
the Navy environment has had its effect on warfare. Ihe
probability is that in future war very few men will actually see
their enemy; they may not even have a mental picture of the
targets at which they will fire; and associated friendly units may
be mere points on a map or blobs of light on a piece of
equipment. But even when this proposition is so, our concept of
command and staff organization in the sense of team spirit, will
not be changed. An introduction of automation and computers into
the command process may make this concept more difficult to
maintain, but nevertheless it will still be there. ^^
Several things happen when computers are introduced into
the Fleet Commander's environment, For example, it is hard to
argue with a computer. The computer responds quickly with a
precise and very definite answer to a question or it gives no
answer at all. No computer ever said in response to a question,
"I never thought of that. Let me think about it," Also, it is
hard to compete with a computer on its terms. If a computer is
programmed to evaluate alternative courses of action, given
certain facts, it will do just that and no more. It will do it so
fast and in such detail that even if a bright young staff officer




hesitate to say so. Finally, the computer executes only
preplanned operation; it never volunteers. Such factors as these
may exert an influence over the staff and the Oommander, as well
as the decision-making process. A person seldom questions the
results of a computer, but the staff should be positive too that
the results obtained are the best possible for the Oommander 's
20purpose •'^^
Implications on the Decision-Malcing Process
The concept of the military decision-making process, as
discussed earlier in this study, will not be changed from the
"estimate of situation" doctrine. But information processing and
the introduction of cybernetics into command and control have
opened up entirely new possibilities in the Fleet Commander's
decision-making capabilities. By eliminating redundant
information, by comparing and screening data, by sorting and
programming significant bits of intelligence, it is possible to
reduce an ovei^whelming amount of facts to manageable proportions
which a Oommajider can comprehend and upon which he can base sound
decisions. Because of the broad scope of the data base which
information processing makes possible, the Oommander can make
decisions which will have a greater degree of validity than ever
20
Ibid ., p. 45.
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before in history. Speed is attalaed, not necessarily by
swifter decisions, but by practically instantaneous assimilation
of vast amounts of data by means of information processing
21
systems.
Man is still the most effective decision malcer. The
problem is in his present ability to be aware of all the factors,
or data, in sufficient time, quantity and quality, that bear on
22
a given situation. Oybernetics and systems such as the Naval
Tactical Data System are in the progress of solving this problem
for the Fleet Commander.
Admiral Robert B. Oarney, U. 3. Navy, pointed out in a
speech at the Haval War Oollege, Washington, D. 0. that the new
technology must be used by the Commander in making decisions:
With the widening rainge of effectiveness of
weapons and electronic technology, the tactical
commander must rely increasingly on electronic
collection of Information, data processing, and
selection of courses of action. Furthermore, many
of the important functions inherent in arriving at
command decision, must be decentralized to
subordinates because of complexity and time factors.
The commander will be plagued by doubts and worries
unless he is keenly informed concerning the workings,
capabilities, and the limitations of the systems
which now serve him in collecting and processing
information and indicating his best course of action.
The commander cannot be absolved from his overall
responsibility, but a considerable measure of his
volition haa.,been infringed by the realities of
technology. -^
21mc Queen, p. 27.
^^S. W. Seabrook Hull, "To Free Man for Oombat, " Data,
(December, 1963), p. 55»
23aobert B. Carney, Admiral, USN, "The Gray Areas of




It should be noted that the oommand and oontrol systems
being considered in this report do not propose to turn over to
oomputers the making of important decisions. Rather, the systems
must be viewed as man/machine complexes in which the machines do
much of the routine work: but men are incorporated in the system
at any point where human judgment is required. Deciding where
these points are, however, is no easy task. Perhaps the easiest
"rule of thumb" to use is that when either a person or computer
could perform a given function, but the person could perform this
function only by following a set of rules as precise and explicit
as an algebraic formula, then the computer should perform the
task. 2^
The Cybernetic Oommand and Oontrol Systems as discussed
in this report provide the key to effective decision-making, to
safe and accurate weapon response to decisions, and to the
desired force manipulation.
Military JDecision and Game Theory
The United States military doctrine of decision prescribes
that a commander select the course of action which offers the
greatest promise of success in view of the enemy's capabilities




betvjeen existing military doctrine and the "theory of games"
proposed by Ton Hewman. Ihe teohnigues of game theory permit an
analysis of the risk involved if the Oommander deviates from
current doctrine to base his decision on his estimate of what he
intends to do rather than on what his enemy is capable of doing,
jphe idea of "mized strategies" presents more difficulties but
may be useful, particularly for command decisions for small
military organizations, -^
In large organizations, possibly through game theory or
some other operations research technique, a staff may be able to
base its planning on both enemy capabilities and intentions,
providing the Oommander ifith additional information and more
alternate choices in reaching a decision^
One of the characteristics of the computer and
cybernetics that make it unique among technical achievements is
that it has forced men to thinic about what they are doing with
clarity and precision. A man cannot instruct the computer to
perform usefully until a plan of attack has been developed. Even
scientists, having wrestled with a computer's demands on
knowledge and logic, are astonished to discover how mental
activity travels in ruts. The rethinking process becomes more
25
difficult as the computer gets better.
^^Haywood, pp. 365-366.
Burck, (I^Sarch, 1964), p. 101.
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Pi*ofessioiial Bxoellenoe of Fleet Oommander
and Staff
The technological revolution requires of the professional
military officer more intelligence, more education and more
expertise than he has ever had before.'^'i^ Vice Admiral ¥. H.
Smedherg made these facts very clear when he said:
TViere is no doubt that the average officer of the
future Navy will uQed. more scientific education than
his counterpart in today's JJavy. . . . Similarly,
commanding officers will require a basic knowled^;e of
all the systems of their ships—even those of
increasing complexity, in order to employ these
systems effectively.^"
Professional excellence is mandatory for the Fleet Commander and
his staff since the advent of cybernetics. !iSiey too must be
experts in their Job,
The S'leet Commander and his staff must have a thorough
technical knowledge of command and control, and of weapon systems
under their control. The absence of such knowledge may mean
defeat instead of victory. The leaders who emerged victorious
from conflicts in the past were experts in their profession.
'Samuel P. Huntington, "Power, Expertise and the Military
Profession," The Profess ions -Daedalus, (Fall, 1963), p. 785.
2Bwiiiiam a. Smedberg, III, Vice Admiral, U3N, "i-lanning




But today, as never before, professional excellence is demanded
of the Fleet Commander and his staff. Due to the complexities
of politico-military decisions, the nature of command and control,
new weapon systems and strides made in information processing,
the requirement for knowledge has multiplied to a sizable degree,
covering such things as nuclear physics and propulsion, new
concepts in decision-making and cybernetic command and control.^
Intelligence and communications are mere aids to combat,
but very essential to the Commander, Only when they are merged
with a thorough technical comprehension on the part of the
Commander may these aids bring about an accurate decision in an
atmosphere of time-compression. It is clearly understood that
information about the enemy is important, but only the proper
utilization of those data by a highly trained commander will
determine the critical issues of the modern military engagement.-*^
A substantial amount of training is being conducted to
handle command and control systems. I4r. Paul Conklin of the
Armed Forces Management magazine, pointed this out in a recent
article when he said
Programmers, operators and other personnel are
being trained to handle HTDS and other types of
command and control systems. Additional and more
training is needed in the top level officer categories
to develop improved software and to manage these new
systems .31
29John I, Hayward and Paul J. Keaney, "Command and Control





Although a substantial amount of training is being
conducted, there is a need for more and better personnel who know
both cybernetics and command and control. Most highly trained
specialists in computers do not understand naval operations—or
professional top-level naval officers do not have sufficient
tra,lning to manage and control Cybernetic Oommand and Oontrol
32Systems."^
Philosophy of Ooiamand
Sarller in this study the nature of the command process,
the organization of the Fleet Commander's staff and its
responsibilities were discussed to provide a guide for further
study into the subject area. The Navy's concept of authority and
responsibility and its application in the case of the Fleet
Commander was outlined to lay a basis for investigation and
analysis. In reviewing the functions of the Fleet Commander,
after the introduction of cybernetics into his environment, there
Is no question that command is still the governing principle
today as it was In the past. Although the Increase in size of
forces, expansion of the field of combat and centralization of
control aspect have created problems as well as implications for
the Fleet Commander, the ultimate command responsibility has




The groirth and present form of the Fleet Oomraander's
staff derive directly from the increasing burden on the
Oomaiander. Unable to divide his command responsibility, the
Oommander has assistants to acquire, assemble, and evaluate the
increasing number and variety of facts, figures, and reports
needed to make adequate plans and to reach correct decisions.
Once orders based on these decisions are issued, the staff
provides the necessary extension of the commander's power to
monitor and control the execution of the orders and directives
issued. ^-^
Cybernetic Oommand and Control Systems provide the means
for the staff to handle the Commander's burdens faster and better
than they oould during 'iorld War II. Since the war days of staff
work, the Fleet Commander's staff has increased in size and has
oome to incorporate the wide range of technical specialists on
the staff today. 3^
With computers assisting the staff in performance of their
functions, more specialists have been required, such as
programmers, systems people and others highly trained personnel.
In the future as the integrated system becomes operational, sub-




be required for staff work. Looking into the future, the size
of the staff will be reduced, but the number of specialists will
be increased.
The details of execution, although influenced by
established doctrine and operating procedures, are the business
of the Fleet Ooiaaiander and his subordinate commanders. The
Fleet Commander's purpose is the control of detailed action in
progress. So far, the adoption of new and better communication
and control devices has been done with an awareness that if the
principle of command responsibility is to be retained, the value
of tactical initiative maintained, the flexibility and power in
weapons sustained, the nation must adhere to the tested principle
of centralized command with decentralized combat control at the
scene of action. ^^
^^ Il?id .. p. 37.

OHAPTEH VI
AN AUALOGT OP MILITART AND NON-
HILITASY IICPLI0AII0H3
It is title consensus among oomputer professionals that
most scientific and business systems, especially large-scale ones,
will become oii-line and will have important man/machine aspects.^
therefore, thsse military systems, i.e.. Navy command and control
systems, represent pioneering technical efforts in information
procassing systems; they are the vanguard of a new and important
generation of information processing systems* future scientific
systems will look functionally lilce oom^mand and control system
fonetions.
These new systems will receive data from many tasks
simultaneously. Functions of input and output will grow in
relative importance and complesity to central processing; multi-
oomputers will be called upon to implement the tasks. ^ Consider
the multi-operations of a future scientific system in a typical
aero-spaoe company: nest data are continuously arriving from
^Bauer, p. 13
•




outlying stations and being formatted, k trajectory problem is
being run, man/machine requests are being updated on reliability
and inventory records. Up-to-date information is forwarded to the
company and handled in "real-time."
Both the Oommander and the executive require information
by automatic techniques for decision-making.-' As an example:
A marfceting executive—this executive must receive information
from many sources such as advertising agencies, sales outlets $ and
supply or inventory areas; then decisions are made involving
prices, shipments, and further advertising, fhe Commander
receives information, also from many sources, including
intelligence, communications and operations; then decisions are
made Involving weapon systems, tactical maneuvex'lng and other
operational decision-making.
An area where business and military manageiiient can be
compared is centralized and decentralized control, and decision-
making. The trend is toward an increasing volume of exchange
throughout the chain of command in the military organization,
as well as through the levels of the business organization. One
of the reasons for this increased flow of information is
automatic data processing. X'his means there is an increasing need
for acquiring, screening, collating, displaying and evaluating
information, and in transmitting reports, decisions and orders.
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In both business and military, control must exist at all
levels. When Automatic Data Processing for control is used in
military, such as in command and control, centralized control
must be available from the highest level to the smallest military
unit if that unit is the military force to be applied at a
precise location and if the decision to use it must be quickly
4
made from the national level.
Decentralized control must also exist at all levels. This
is necessary since any level of command could be destroyed or
rendered impotent through loss of ability to communicate. These
two theories—centralization and decentralization—are opposites
in theory but complementary in fact.^
Business in recent years has placed emphasis on the
philosophy of decentralization. But the consensus is that
centralization cannot be neglected, especially when companies use
automatic data processing. Decentralization without centralization
means organizations cannot survive—companies require coordination
and a unity of purpose.^
For further comparison of military and nonmilitary, a look
at the effects of changing technology on management is worthwhile.
^Pred ¥. Kittler, Oaptain, USH, "Command Oontrol—The
Navy's Link to Grlobal Strategy, " IJaval Sat^lneers Journal .
(February, 1963), p. 32.
5lbld., p. 28.
^Phillpson (ed.), p. 71.
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The business manager of the future will have to recognize that
aany accepted business concepts have become outmoded as a result
of rapid shifts in technology. The military commander is
required to look at planning from an entirely different view,
due to the need for the right information at the right time. The
business manager, as well, will have to look at business planning
from a different viewpoint. For example, due to automation,
management will have a capacity never before possible to
centralize or decentralize its decision function. The same is
true in the military. Even as fundamental a concept as the
definition of a business may have to be changed just as the Fleet
Commander's concept of combat is being changed due to command and
control.
Planning is an important aspect of command and control
management, as it is in business management. The Commander
requires concrete planning to cover any foreseeable contingency
in operations. The manager in business must also plan. He must
plan for change; and its counterpart, planning necessitated by
change,' The reason the manager must pay closer attention to his
planning is that by competition through technological innovation
and scientific revolution the commercial life of a company's
product is shortened. It has shortened the life of business and
7"The Challenge of Technology to Management," I<etter by
Association of Consultin,'?; Manap;ement Engineers , 1963,- Series j^Io. 1
(October, 1963), p. 4.
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Industrial processes, but has Increased the complexity and
tightened the interrelationships of functions.
Next, an analogy can be made between military and non-
military implications in the area of decision-making. As the pace
of warfare has quickened, there has been a shift of emphasis from
the tactical decision (moment-by-moment direction of battle) to
strategic planning (preparing for possible eventualities,
establishing policy, and determining in advance how tactical
decisions will be made.) Ihe Uavy Fleet Commander can no longer
plot the course of enemy's ships on a chart and personally
calculate the aiming point. In fact, with a ballistic missile
there isn't sufficient time to select a defensive weapon.^
Squally in business : As the pace of technological change
quickens, corporate management, even at the lower levels, must
focus more and more on the strategic problems of running the
Q
business and less on the everyday operating problems.
As the complexity of war has increased due to the
technological change, the duties of naval command have multiplied
until the Fleet Commander of today is immersed in executive and
administrative tasks that resemble those of a corporation
Q
Jay vf. Forrester, "Industrial Dynamics: A Major Break
Through for Decision Makers^" Harvard Business Review . (July-




president. The major differenoe wiiich sets the Oosoiaander apart
Is the undiminished operation of the principle of command
responsibility,^^ The Commander has truly becoiii^ a planner and
decision maker in the corporate image, while retaining the
military leader's moral, legal and historical responsibility for
Implei'iienting those plans and decisions.
Just as the Oomiaander resembles a modern corporate
executive, his staff also resembles the management echelon of a
large and diversified firm. Of course there are differences, such
as the principal characteristic of the military staff, its
identification witn and relationship to the Commander. The
philosophy, indeed the personality, of the Oomiaander pervades his
staff in a way and to a degree entirely unlike the workings of
corporate policy. This group of diversified specialists, whose
collective technical ability is an absolute prerequisite to command
of a large force, become a ooheslve and finely tuned instrument
11
to extend the span of control of the Commander. It is this
atunemeat, this linked intelligence, that permits decision-making
by the Commander across a range of technical matters that would be
oofflpletely beyond the capability of any one man to master. And it
is by the same unique linkage of intelligence devoted to a common
^^Ohastain, p. 34,
13. Ibid ., p. 35.
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purpose that the far-flung and diverse elements of command are
welded into a force capable of coordinated action. The trend in
industry is the same. The corporate president, because of
intellectual and technical demands, must have a staff of
specialists to advise him on special aspects of his Job so all
the possible knowledge can be brought to bear on the problem in
question. ^^
The Ohallenge of Technology to Hsinagement, " Letter by
Association of OonsultluK Mana,a;eaent Engineers . 1963, Series No. 1





The Impact of the current technological revolution, the
reduction in reaction time for military commanders to make
decisions, and the requirements for alternate choices in deciding
courses of action in possible future wars have made it essential
that Fleet Commanders be provided Cybernetic Command and Control
Systems, Whether the Navy likes it or not, it is destined for
a preplanned push-button mode of warfare. The Navy's success in
this conceivable conflict is contingent upon how wisely
information technology is utilized and cybernetic command and
control is achieved.
Primarily, the Navy's approach in achieving cybernetic
command and control has been in the equipment area with increased
emphasis on programs and systems. To exploit this new
technology for maximum Navy benefit, it is imperative that
increased attention be given the "man" within the command and




been directed toward the "man's" role, specifically the Fleet
Oommander ' s role in these new systems.
As discussed and reviewed earlier, command and control
is not a new development. Military commanders have always
devised organizations and methods to secure knowledge needed to
make informed decisions. In the past as today, the human element
played an important part in collecting information and making
decisions. For example, the Combat Information Center of World
War II collected, displayed, evaluated and presented the Commander
with decision-making information; throughout this system there
were many man/machine interfaces. So, as the human element was
needed in the past it is needed today, and will be needed in the
systems of the future. Of course, the requirement for men will
be changed to some degree, since new command and control systems
will relieve the Commander and his staff of some of the routine
type decisions, but assuredly the prediction can be made that
primary top level decisions will be made by an individual such as
the Fleet Commander.
In analyzing the Fleet Commander and the command and
control concept, this study revealed that the role of the
Commander is two-fold: First, the role of a Uaval Commander aa
a planner and executer of strategy and tactics; second, the role
of a Naval lianager in the management control of a Cybernetic
Command ajad Control Systems. Therefore, to handle this dual role,
A «••>,•/
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the Oommander must be redesigned into a highly trained specialist,
who has an ingrained operational knowledge of tactical force
operations combined with a thorough understanding of the
management concept of cybernetics.
Because of "real-time" operations, the new approach to
command and control must be the "total systems" approach. The
Fleet Commander's requirements for this approach include:
1. A command and control system providing complete force
control through computer analysis.
2. A general purpose, digital type computer operating
"on-line--real-time" with a large scale stora-ge and data
processing capability, and wide ranging and flexible information
request devices.
3. A system providing a considerable number of attack
options to meet a large set of predicted military situations.
4. A provision for the Fleet Oommander to be separated
from the massive and complex data manipulation function to handle
his decision-making functions.
5. A central data processing system consisting of input,
data processing and output elements. This primary system to be
the technical heart of a well-integrated command and control
system.
6. Supporting subsystems which provide instantaneous
input to the central computer complex. These subsystems to be part
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of the total integrated system, but at the same time be capable
of independent operation if any of the systems become inoperable
for any reason.
7, A man/machine concept which will provide a closer
relationship between the Commander and his equipment. The machine
system must be organized to give and receive data from the
Oommander on the Commander's terms.
The data processing system and subsystems organize
information into a more readily usable form, to help the Commander
plan better and faster and make more knowledgeable decisions.
They do not usurp the Commander's prerogatives; this system extends
his intellect and amplifies his ability to handle many facts
affecting decisions.
The problem areas in the development of a command and
control system which will meet the Fleet Commander's requirements
are as follows
:
1^ Communications problems . For the Fleet Oommander to
do his job, communications must be reliable and survivable. The
solution to this problem centers on the development of
communications through hardening, dispersal and redundancy.
Through development in micro-electronics, size and weight are
being reduced in communication equipment; and reliability and
survivability are being increased. Today, it appears the solution
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to oomiauuication problems is further advanced than many of the
other problem areas.
2, Problems In Data Handling . This problem area is
threefold, including problems In "equipment," "programs," and
the development of man/maohine concept. Computer technology has
developed so rapidly that program and system elements in the
command and control area have been unable to keep pace. Also,
strategic and tactical problems must be analyzed, and systems
devised before hardware can be properly developed. Substantial
progress is being made in all areas of data handling, but there
has been major improvement of late in programming production.
There is a better understanding in the Department of Defense of
the management and development aspects of this problem area.
Increased emphasis is being placed on the man/machine complex by
all services. An increasing understanding of decision-making as
a man/machine process and other developments leading to
technological improvements are receiving top priority by experts
in command and control.
3. Problems in Requirements . Considerable improvement
has been made in the last year in determining the requirements of
systems. Commanders and those who make command and control
machinery are beginning to work closer together to answer what
the Commander really needs to know in a combat situation.
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The problems oonfrontlng the experts in command and
control loom large In the years ahead, hut based on present
progress, these problems will be solved.
Future Improvements, according to these experts, will not
be great leaps foiTfard but modest improvements which will meet
the needs of the Fleet Commander.
The impact of information technology in the business
world has created implications on management which in some cases
are similar to the effect on military command.
Businesses are using the principle of cybernation in
information processing and management information systems. The
advent of information technology on the nonmilitary scene has
created many problems and changes in traditional management
practices. Also, predictions indicate even more changes for
corporations in the middle-management, planning and decision-
making areas.
By 1970, nearly all electronic data processing systems in
large corporations will be of an on-line—real-time variety. This
prediction is based on a careful analysis of historical
developments, present trends, basic economic pressures, and the




Because of the introduction of information technology and
cybernetics, the following analogies are listed in comparing
military and nonmilitary implications
:
1. It is the consensus that most scientific and business
systems, especially the large ones, will become on-line—real-tim©
operations with Important man/machine aspects. Military systems
represent pioneering technical efforts in information processing.
2. Both the Oommander and the executive will require
information 'oy automatic techniques for decision-malcing. In
decislon-malcing there has been a shift of emphasis in both
military and nonmilitary organizations. In the military, the
shift has \)een from tactical decisions to strategic planning;
while in business, top management stresses the strategic problems
of operating corporations and shows less interest in the everyday
operating problems.
3. Oentralization and decentralisation of decision-making
can be compared between the military and nonmilitary management.
The trend is toward an increasing volume of exchange throughout
the chain of command in the military organization, as well as
throughout the levels of the business organization. The primary
reason for this increase in information flow is the growth of
infonaatlon processing. In both business and military, control
must exist at all levels and extend from top to bottom under the
concept of large multi-computer complexes.
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4. Tae changing technology has affected both business and
military management. The military commander is required to look
at his planning from an entirely different view because of his
need for the right iziformation at t-ie right ti:ae. I'he business
manager also has to have better planning because technological
revolution and scientific revolution are shortening the commercial
life of his product, his company's business and industrial
processes, and have increased the complexity and tightened the
Interrelationships of functions.
Oonclusions
In reviewing the development of cybernetic command and
control, and analysing the Fleet Commander's organization, there
are a number of significant implications which affect the Fleet
Commander, his staff, its responsibilities, organization and
decision-maicing processes.
The element of decision is of primary importance.
Decision is recognized as the basic structure upon which Naval
staffs are organized. Information processing provides the staff
with a means of furnishing adequate information for the Commander
in his decision-making process. Therefore, since the impact on
decision-making is the most important of the implications discussed





!• Peels ion-mafelng . Information processing and
cybernetics have opened new possibilities in military decision-
making. A Fleet Oommander will have more manageable information
which he can comprehend and upon which he can base sound decisions.
Decisions will have more validity and speed will be attained
because of instantaneous assimilation of data by means of
information processing.
jPhe recent emphasis on military command and control has
resulted from the realization that information processing
equipment, such as the laval laotioal Data System, can greatly
assist a Fleet Oommander in making accurate and timely decisions
that otherwise could not be made without considerable human
effort.
Individuals properly trained and experienced in the
decision-making process remain the most valuable asset in any
command and control system. Therefore, the man is still the best
decision maker. Computers will not take over the making of
important decisions, but they may be programmed to make decisions
of a routine type.
Oybernetic Command and Control Systems provide the key to
effective decision, to safe and accurate weapon response and to
the desired manipulation of forces by the Fleet Oommander.
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In the future, game theory and other operations research
techniques will be used to develop operation plans and orders to
provide the Commander with more accurate and newer information
for decision-mafeing purposes,
2» Fleet Ooiamander and His Staff . Automation and
information processing provide faster accomplishment of what used
to be routine functions, many of which are beyond the capacity of
human organization to manipulate available data. This capability
will increase the responsiveness of command and free the Commander
and his staff for broader probleois.
Oomputers organize inforriiation into a more readily usable
form, to help the Oommander plan better and make faster decisions.
Oommand and control, and communications at all levels, national as
well as local, facilitate the proper response under all conditions,
both strategic and tactical levels of command,
The introduction of cybernetics into the oommand systems
will not significantly decrease the dependence of the Oommander on
his staff for information. Further, the computer system will be
embedded in the operation, language and mission of the Fleet
Oommander. Oomputers will remove much of the menial calculation
woricload-—providing the Oommander with the much needed time for
studying the situation and making decisions.
Prior to the introduction of the computer into the command
and control environment, information processing was handled by the
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Oo!amander*s staff. Colleotion and assimilation of data for
operation plans was a tiresome and time-consuming effort. During
training or combat operations, collection of information has been
a alow process because of unreliable communications and inadequate
sensing equipment. With the advent of the computer and Improved
communications and sensing equipment, tho collectloa, assimilation
and dissemination of information, as Tfsll as its processing, has
provided a greater quantity of more timely and accurate
information for the Commander's decision-making
.
Within the process of providing information for the i<'leet
Commander, all staff functional areas have ^een improved due to
the development of command and control systems. The Commander
will be able to control detailed action in progress with more
assurance because information will be of an improved quality.
His command function has remained undiluted hy the lengthening
chain of responsibility. If the Kavy expects to maintain this
philosophy of command in the future it must adhere to the tested
principle of centralized command with decentralized combat control
at the scene of action.
3, Centralization Trend . The trend is toward centralized
military/ control. .National, political and military leaders have
made it cloar that the use of military forces world-wide must be
centrally monitored and controlled. The primary reason is the
possibility that uncontrolled action at any point could trigger
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reactions escalating Into a nuclear war. Therefore, in the
initial conflict the Fleet Ooinmander * s responsibility in control
of his forces has diminished when compared with World War II,
Since there is the possibility of nuclear war, Commanders
must have decentralization as well as centralization. If the
means for decentralized control did not exist, the entire
structure could collapse if the center of control were destroyed.
Ihe lower level commanders must be capable of taking over command
of any situation.
4. Professional Excellence . The technological revolution
requires of the military officer more intelligence, more education
and more expertise than ever before. The Fleet Commander and his
staff must have a thorough knowledge of command and control and
weapon systems under their control. The absence of suoh knowledge
may mean defeat instead of victory.
Oybernetics and information processing are providing
information for decision-making; to utilize this data the
Commander and his stiff must be highly trained. Today, a real
challenge in the JUavy is to produce the necessary professionals to
handle the wars of tomorrow.
Emphasis in this study has been placed on the Fleet
Commander in Cybernetic Command and Control Systems. In the past
equipment programs and systems have been stressed to varying
degrees, but if this nation expects to have its forces managed and
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controlled effectively in peace and war, increased emphasis must
be placed on the human element of command and control as well as
technological areas. If the Navy and the nation fail to give
adequate consideration to the man, the consequences may be
disastrous in case of attack. All areas and phases must be
Investigated and developed to provide adequate command and control
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